For much of the past decade, the strategic community in the United States has viewed China through the lens of a "power transition", perceiving the bilateral relationship as a contest between what they believe is a "rising power" and an established one. This perspective has fueled debates on the "Thucydides Trap", long-term strategic competition and even a potential "new Cold War".
This wasn't always how Washington viewed China's growth. In 2005, then US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick urged China to become a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system.
At that time, the prevailing belief in Washington was that a stronger China could be integrated into the existing international framework if it assumed greater responsibilities. Two decades later, the debate has changed considerably, with Chinese capabilities now treated as strategic concerns.
Yet, the current relationship between China and the US does not fit into a conventional "power-transition" framework. While China's economic and technological capabilities have grown enormously, the US maintains formidable advantages in advanced technology, finance and its network of alliances.
Years of trade and technology tensions have shown that attempts to stifle the momentum of bilateral ties may backfire, as emerging industries and technologies continue to forge new connections between the two nations.
China does not view its development as a race with the US for global leadership. Its primary objective remains its own modernization. A more prosperous and technologically advanced China will naturally assume a larger role in international affairs, but that does not mean measuring its success against US power, let alone seeking to replace the US role in the international system.
The problem arises when Washington interprets every gain in Chinese capabilities as a corresponding loss of US advantages. Technological breakthroughs by China, expansion of ties with third countries and increases in the market share of Chinese companies are often scrutinized as potential "national security threats", prompting harsh restrictive measures that invite countermeasures.
Therefore, building a constructive bilateral relationship of strategic stability, as agreed by President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump, requires setting boundaries around competition.
The first boundary concerns the purpose of competition. China has consistently stated that it does not intend to challenge or replace the US. Washington must also clarify a long-standing question: What is the desired end state of US competition with China?
An objective assessment of China's economic and technological strengths and its weight in international affairs will help the US better protect its interests while managing differences and ensuring fair competition.
If every increase in Chinese capabilities is treated as a diminution of US security, it becomes difficult to achieve a stable equilibrium.
The second boundary involves the instruments of competition. Unlike during the Cold War, when US-Soviet economic ties were limited and the dividing lines between the two blocs were relatively clear, China and the US are deeply embedded in the same global economy and technology ecosystem. That makes it harder yet more important to define the boundaries of competition. Today, US national security concerns extend from semiconductors and investment screening to critical minerals, artificial intelligence, robotics and other sectors, while China has strengthened its capacity to protect supply chains and respond to external economic pressure.
Strategic stability does not require either country to remove restrictions where genuine security interests are at stake. However, it does require greater discipline in applying such measures, with clearer objectives, reasonable scope and greater care to prevent disputes in one area from spilling into others.
A pragmatic approach — managing concrete problems rather than expecting to resolve every structural disagreement at once — could be useful not only in trade but across all aspects of bilateral relations.
The third boundary concerns the global reaction to bilateral competition. Many countries maintain extensive relationships with both China and the US and have little interest in reorganizing their foreign and economic policies around this competition.
Beijing and Washington will naturally develop their respective partnerships. But if infrastructure projects, technology standards, supply chains and international institutions are treated as arenas in which one side must defeat the other, and where participants are forced to take sides, bilateral competition risks distorting the international system. Responsible management of competition requires respecting other countries' ability to make choices based on their own interests.
AI offers an early test. As the technology becomes more powerful, shared risks, such as cybersecurity and data security, have emerged. "Competition within limits" between China and the US will have practical meaning if the two countries manage their disagreements over technology restrictions while maintaining communication or even cooperating on AI-related issues.
It's unlikely that such boundaries will be drawn once and for all, but the two sides can and should enhance exchanges to gradually develop clearer understandings of where they compete and where they cooperate, regardless of political differences.
They should identify each other's fundamental concerns and work to prevent individual disputes from overwhelming the broader relationship.
Long-term efforts are needed to address these questions, because neither country is likely to disappear from the other's strategic horizon, and neither can expect to make the other change through pressure.
If Washington can move beyond a simplistic "power-transition" narrative and collaborate with Beijing to establish boundaries around the purposes, instruments and reach of their competition, the foundation of constructive strategic stability in bilateral ties will be further strengthened, with significant implications for both countries and the world.
The author is a fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University.
Editor：Zhou Jinmiao
